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ROBERT W. HAHN*

Innovative Approaches for
Revising the Clean Air Act
ABSTRACT
The deadlinefor meeting the ambient ozone standardwas December 31, 1987. With over fifty regions of the country out of attainment,
there is no possibility that the standardwill be met. Indeed, it may
never be met in some highly polluted areas such as Los Angeles.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest new approachesfor dealing
with the problem of meeting the ozone standard in nonattainment
areas. The paper also examines how these policies could be implemented within the currentpolitical context.
INTRODUCTION'
By the end of 1987, the entire U.S. was required to be in compliance
with the 0.12 parts per million standard for ground level ozone.' If states
or selected regions of the country were not in compliance, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could apply a series of rather
draconian sanctions. These sanctions included severely restricting federal
funds for highways, sewage treatment plants, and air quality programs,
and imposed a ban on construction of major new sources. Recently, EPA
Administrator Lee Thomas identified 76 regions of the country as nonattainment areas. 3 While most of these areas are quite close to being in
compliance with the law, a few, such as Los Angeles and Houston, have
a long way to go.
Congress and the EPA face a difficult dilemma. The deadline is
approaching, the costs of meeting the deadline are unacceptable, and
there is no obvious path to follow. The EPA Administrator characterized
the situation this way:
... the public difference of opinion about EPA's future course of
*The author is currently a senior staff economist with the Council of Economic Advisers on leave
from Carnegie Mellon University. The views in this paper represent those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Council. This research was funded by the National Science Foundation
and the Office of Technology Assessment.
I. National Clean Air Coalition, The Clean Air Act: A Briefing Book for the Members of Congress
26 (Apr. 1985).
2. Id. at 48.
3. Clean Air Standards: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 9 (1987) (testimony of Lee M.

Thomas, EPA Administrator).
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action mirrors the complexity of the ozone issue itself. There is no
obvious course of action. There is no simple course of action. Any
decision on an ozone strategy will have to balance a number of factors
that are more or less important depending on your point of view."
The purpose of this paper is to define new approaches for dealing with
the problem of meeting the ozone standard in nonattainment areas. The
reason for searching for new approaches is simple. The existing approach
is not working very well. Section 2 of the paper provides an overview
of the current approach to regulating ozone. The potential role of marketbased approaches in helping to meet the current standard is examined is
Section 3. Section 4 highlights the key findings and discusses areas for
future research.
THE CURRENT REGULATORY APPROACH
The problem of ozone nonattainment is not new. There is already a
detailed infrastructure which has been created to help meet the ozone
standard. Congress has grappled with this problem in the 1970 Clean Air
Act and the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. It is useful to examine the
basic design of this Act as a first step in developing reform proposals. 5
In order to comply with the national ozone standard of 0.12 parts per
million, the Act requires that states submit a plan which has to be approved
by the EPA. State Implementation Plans for ozone were required to be
submitted in 1979 for ozone nonattainment areas. Areas which could not
demonstrate attainment by 1982 had to submit revisions in 1982 which
would demonstrate attainment no later than 1987.
The plans generally consist of a series of control measures aimed
primarily at limiting emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs)
from existing stationary sources. In addition, many areas have implemented inspection and maintenance programs which attempt to reduce
emissions of hydrocarbons from motor vehicles. Most of the implementation plans require specific reductions from individual sources or classes
of sources. In many cases, even the nature of the technology is specified.
This is the cornerstone of the so-called "command-and-control" approach.
In some instances, other alternatives have been explored. For example,
the EPA has attempted to promote the trading of "emission reduction
credits" as a way of providing firms with greater flexibility in meeting
emissions objectives. These credits are limited forms of property rights
that can be created when firms reduce their emissions beyond specified
4. Id. at 17-18.
5. See R. STEWART & J.

complete account.

KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND

POLICY (2d ed. 1978) for a more
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regulatory requirements. To date, programs involving "emissions trading" have not been a critical part of state plans aimed at achieving
attainment."
Placing the primary responsibility for the development of plans on the
states and local regions represents a sensible approach to environmental
regulation. Within this context, it is important to develop a set of workable
plans that will help meet the objectives mandated by Congress. Unfortunately, these plans are difficult to design and implement in some nonattainment areas. Most low cost technology-based standards have been
applied. What remains are a series of high cost options. States, locales,
and even the EPA, are finding it increasingly difficult to induce industry
to use options that are quite expensive and offer relatively modest gains
in moving towards the standard.
The command-and-control approach is unlikely to make significant
progress towards meeting the ozone standard in severe nonattainment
areas. Thus, it is worthwhile considering new approaches which may.
One possibility is the use of market-based approaches similar to those
promulgated under EPA's emissions trading programs.! The idea behind
these approaches is to specify an overall ceiling for allowable emissions,
but to allow firms a great deal of flexibility in choosing technologies to
reduce emissions. In some instances it may be possible to design systems
which have the potential to both achieve cost savings and improve environmental quality in a timely manner. Whether these benefits can be
achieved in practice depends on the nature of the systems which are put
into place.
DESIGNING AND EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES
The basic problem is to develop a framework which would enable
nonattainment areas to meet the ambient standards, or substantially reduce
their ozone concentrations in a timely manner. The subsequent analysis
will take the goal of meeting the existing ambient ozone standard as a
"given"; not because I believe this standard is justified, but because this
is the way that Congress and EPA have chosen to frame the problem.
A major factor affecting the speed with which attainment can be reached
6. See R. Hahn & G. Hester, Where Did All The Markets Go?: An Analysis of EPA's Emissions
Trading Program (1986) (Working Paper 87-3, Sch. of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie Mellon
Univ., Pittsburgh, Pa., forthcoming in the YALE J. ON REG.). See also R. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR
POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIl AND TROUBLE OF EPA's BUBBLE (1986). While these authors note
that the overall use of trading programs has been limited, they also argue that the programs have
resulted in significant cost savings to participants in the programs. The effect that these programs
have had on overall environmental quality appears to have been small.
7. R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 6.
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is the cost of pollution control.' The question is whether it is possible to
substantially reduce the control costs while maintaining or enhancing
environmental quality. Here, I will argue that it is, indeed, possible to
substantially reduce costs by placing appropriate incentives on firms to
search for less expensive ways of reducing VOCs and nitrogen oxide
emissions (NO,), the two primary chemical species which contribute to
the formation of ozone. The key idea is to design a regulatory system
that promotes greater flexibility for individual firms, while still making
significant strides towards attainment of the ozone standard.
One alternative frequently suggested by economists for increasing flexibility is marketable permits. The implementation of a marketable permit
system involves several steps. First, a target level of environmental quality
is established. Next, this level of environmental quality is defined in
terms of total allowable emissions. Permits, which are essentially limited
property rights, are then allocated to firms. Each permit enables the owner
to emit a specified amount of pollution. Firms are allowed to trade these
permits amongst themselves. This feature gives firms greater flexibility
in their abatement decisions. However, environmental quality is preserved
by limiting the total number of available permits.
The theory behind the use of marketable permits is well established.
Such approaches can, in theory, result in considerable reductions in cost
without sacrificing environmental objectives. 9 The practical aspects of
these systems, however, are only now beginning to be appreciated. Over
the past decade, EPA has implemented a program which is similar in
spirit to the use of marketable permits. The "emissions trading program"
is designed to provide firms with greater flexibility without sacrificing
environmental quality. Measured in terms of cost savings, the program
has been a success. Cost savings have resulted in the billions of dollars. ,
Since the emissions trading program is already in place, it is important
to consider whether this program will, in itself, be sufficient to promote
attainment. The answer to this question is, unfortunately, no. At present,
states have the option of whether they want to use some form of emissions
trading as part of their attainment strategies. While elements of emissions
trading are used in a large number of areas, the current program appears
to have had little effect on environmental quality. This is, in part, because
emissions trading represents a relatively small element of the existing
regulatory approach. It is also because emissions trading is not explicitly
designed to meet ambient standards, though parts of the program are
aimed at reducing emissions. With suitable modifications, however, it
8. There are, of course, other factors and these will be considered shortly.
9. Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5. J. OF ECON.
THEORY 395 (1972).
10. R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 6.
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would be possible to fashion-an emissions trading program that would
help address the ozone nonattainment problem.
Within the context of existing requirements for State Implementation
Plans, there are two key criteria that need to be met for a program to be
approved by EPA. The first is that the plan pinpoint identifiable emissions
reductions from specific sources. The second is that it demonstrate that
the projected emissions reductions will allow the area to meet.the ambient
standard for ozone. Since many states have plans that were approved by
EPA, yet are still not in attainment, it is worth examining how this
situation arose. As several authors have noted, there are many problems
with the process." There is a great deal of uncertainty in emissions
inventories, and in the relationship between emissions and ambient air
quality. It is also difficult to project economic growth and the effectiveness
of different control options. Moreover, there are incentives for states to
be overly optimistic in their projections. Thus, control options which are
promised in the plan are not always implemented. Any alternatives that
will be implemented should take these design requirements and uncertainties into account.
In devising any practical alternative, it is important to specify how
decisions and responsibilities should be divided among state and federal
regulators, and the Congress. For purposes of analysis, it will be assumed
that Congress will specify a time frame in which the 0.12 ppm standard
must be met. This time frame could vary across regions depending on
the difficulties that are likely to be encountered in meeting attainment.
One important consideration in setting a deadline or series of deadlines
is the likelihood that regions will comply with the deadline. If deadlines
are going to serve as more than symbolic gestures, it would be helpful
if considerations of political and technical feasibility entered into the
development of new legislation. Moreover, realistic mechanisms for
enforcement will need to be added.
While Congress is in a good position to decide on general policy
objectives, micromanagement is better left to federal and state agencies.
One general problem which the states and EPA will need to grapple with
is the definition of required emissions reductions of NO, and VOCs. This
exercise will need to be based on environmental modeling which predicts
how ozone concentrations vary with different emission profiles. The general approach to this problem would be similar to the current approach
taken with State Implementation Plans involving ozone control.
The problem of defining broad guidelines and general emissions targets
applies to any program aimed at widespread environmental control. For
specific applications involving market-based mechanisms, there are sevI1. See R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 6; R. Liroff, supra note 6, at 25-34.
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eral other steps which need to be taken. At a general level, the rules for
trading need to be specified. A good rule of thumb to follow is to encourage
trading when it reduces costs, but does not compromise environmental
quality. A key issue involving ozone attainment is whether trading should
be allowed across different types of emissions. While EPA probably has
the authority to allow interpollutant trading for ozone attainment, an
endorsement from Congress would be helpful in expediting the development of this policy. Moreover, Congress may want to consider developing a framework which explicitly acknowledges interdependencies among
pollutant problems. For example, NO. emissions represent an important
part of the acid rain problem as well as the ozone problem. By taking
advantage of certain chemical interconnections, it will be possible to
reduce the costs of achieving environmental goals.
Some of the most difficult political and administrative problems arise
in designing the detailed applications of market-based alternatives. The
options considered below will examine three different questions. First,
how are emission rights defined and allocated? This is a critical question
for determining who bears the costs of emission control, and how reductions are going to be achieved over time. Second, how are specific trading
rules defined? This definition is critical in defining the scope for trading
and the potential for cost savings and environmental quality improvements. Third, what type of administrative changes will be needed under
the new system? This issue is important for assessing the practical feasibility of a proposal.
Three options are considered here. These options all represent significant departures from the current policy. However, they differ in the degree
to which they supplant the existing command-and-control approach. Each
plan involves the reductions of VOC emissions and/or NO, emissions.
Trading across pollutant categories would be allowed under all plans. As
noted above, previous control strategies have been defined primarily in
terms of VOC reductions; thus, allowing trading between NO, and VOC
emissions would represent an important change in existing policy.
The first option consists of organizing a full-scale market in property
rights for emission credits. Organization of the market requires establishing a baseline for defining emission rights. States and local areas
would be charged with defining the relevant baseline subject to broad
guidelines set forth by EPA. Existing emissions inventories could be used
to establish and revise this baseline. One alternative for establishing the
baseline is to issue emissions rights for a specified period on the basis
of actual emissions. This is similar to the approach that EPA has advocated
in its final emission trading policy statement." This allocation scheme is
12. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814-60 (1986).
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based on the grandfathering of emission rights. It takes the existing distribution of emissions as a legitimate basis for defining tradable rights.
Firms which have already spent large sums of money on cleaning up
pollution abatement may object to this system on the grounds that it
rewards firms that have not shouldered their fair share of the burden. If
these objections are strenuous, states may choose to establish other baselines that reflect local concerns. For example, some states might retain
some rights for the public, and sell or auction these rights off to raise
money for promoting environmental quality. Environmentalists could be
expected to favor options which force industry to pay for polluting activities.
Once a realistic baseline is established for emission rights in both VOCs
and NO. emissions, a plan needs to be developed which yields the necessary emissions reductions. This can be accomplished relatively easily
by reallocating emissions rights at specified intervals. For example, suppose that in the first year of the program, 100 rights were issued which
allowed 100 tons of VOCs to be emitted. In year two, the objective is
to cut these emissions in half. This could be done by redefining the value
of existing rights, so that each right corresponds to .5 tons as opposed
to 1 ton. In order to provide industry with some certainty, states would
want to define the system for reducing rights with great care. The objective
should be to provide firms with certainty while building enough flexibility
in the system to adapt to changing environmental conditions. 3
It is important to recognize that the rules set up for reducing emissions
can have an important effect on how individual firms respond to the
market-based system. If firms which reduce emissions by more than the
average are unduly penalized, this will make them think twice about
exploring new technologies which would lead to any further emissions
reductions. A simple way to avoid this problem is to dilute the value of
existing emissions rights by some fixed fraction for all firms, independent
of their previous performance.
A problem will also arise in situations where firms are emitting at levels
that exceed those allowed by their emission rights. This problem is precisely analogous to the problem where an operating permit is violated.
The regulatory agency will need to develop ways of dealing with such
problems. A logical place to start is to refer these problems to the enforcement staff. It remains an open question as to whether the enforcement
staff will need to be increased to accommodate a market-based regulatory
initiative.
13. Hahn & Noll, Implementing Tradable Emission Permits, in REFORMING SOCIAL REGULATION:
ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC POLICY STRATEGIES, 125-50 (L. Graymer & F. Thompson eds. 1982).
14. A market-based system could provide firms with additional incentives to police other firms.
The value of a firm's marketable permits will depend, among other things, on the effectiveness of
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The states and local areas would develop plans subject to EPA approval.
EPA should produce broad guidelines which suggest what types of trades
are acceptable, and how to set appropriate parameters. 5 For example,
EPA could produce guidelines on trades involving mobile and stationary
sources, and trades which involve more than one pollutant. In the case
of interpollutant trading which involves VOCs and NO., EPA should
suggest appropriate modeling requirements for states. Decisions on specific trading rules should be left to the states. Like Congress, EPA should
try to avoid micromanagement.
Note that this proposal would not distinguish between new and existing
sources. New firms would not be required to meet any specific standard,
but they would be required to own emission credits corresponding to their
existing emissions. This is a dramatic departure from existing law, which
imposes more stringent restrictions on new sources in the hopes that this
will eventually result in better environmental quality.' 6 Environmentalists
have been strong supporters of legislation which imposes stringent
requirements on new sources. They are unlikely to support this system
unless they can be persuaded that it offers the potential for substantial
improvements in environmental quality relative to the status quo.
Moving to a full-blown market approach would require some important
changes in the way regulatory agencies do business. Engineering staff at
state and local levels in charge of writing standards would now be asked
to evaluate the validity of trades in terms of their environmental benefits.
A record keeping system would need to be installed to keep track of
changing ownership of emission rights. This system would rely primarily
on the self-reporting of firms along with occasional inspections."
One important issue relates to the definition of valid trades. To promote
the enforcement system. Where the marginal gains from private enforcement actions exceed the
marginal costs, firms could be expected to help enforcement authorities. On the other hand, it may
be more difficult to bring enforcement actions under a marketable permits system. Since the explicit
monetary stakes are higher, there may be a greater tendency to use the court system rather than
using traditional administrative approaches. Moreover, it may be necessary to specify the nature of
the violation with greater precision in order to assess the appropriate remedies. These issues have
been addressed at great length in theory. The time is now ripe for a careful applied study of
enforcement issues as they relate to market-based systems which have actually been implemented.
For an overall evaluation of the performance of marketable permit systems, see R. Hahn & G.
Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice (1987) (Working Paper, School of
Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh, Pa., presented at the 1987 APPAM
meetings).
15. Without such guidance, it is unlikely that the states would expand the domain for emissions
trading. Reasons for the states' unwillingness to change include limited resources, a general view
that emissions trading imposes additional burdens on state regulators, and a reluctance to develop

new programs which might not be acceptable to federal regulators and/or environmentalists.
16. In reality, the effect of the new source legislation has been to induce many firms to retain
outdated plant and equipment for a longer time period than they otherwise would have.
17. This is the dominant approach used in environmental monitoring and enforcement in the U.S.
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cost savings, trading should be defined as broadly as possible. For example, electric utilities that show demonstrable gains in environmental quality as a result of conservation efforts should receive the same treatment
as utilities that choose to install hardware, such as scrubbers. The precise
details of trading rules should depend on key parameters related to the
transport and formation of ozone. States and local areas should be given
a broad mandate so they can tailor trading programs to their individual
needs and capabilities.
At the federal level, EPA would have to increase its oversight function.
It would want to focus on the validity of baseline estimates as well as
evidence that the state was heading towards its attainment goals. EPA
could accomplish this oversight through occasional auditing of individual
trades; asking for updates on aggregate emissions of NO, and VOCs; and
using data from existing monitoring networks.
This proposal would face many hurdles in implementation. However,
none of these hurdles are insurmountable. The problem of establishing
an appropriate baseline is already addressed under current State Implementation Plans. There is, admittedly a great deal of uncertainty in emission baselines and inventories. " This does not imply, however, that trading
cannot work effectively any more than it implies that command-andcontrol approaches cannot work effectively. What it does suggest is that
the design of a trading system needs to take the quality of the existing
data into account.19
There are several ways that safeguards can be built into the system.
At an aggregate level, if specific interim targets related to air quality were
not met, the plan could call for greater across-the-board reductions in
emissions rights. At the level of individual trades, EPA could expand its
role as an auditor, in much the same way that the Internal Revenue Service
does. Instead of trying to monitor each individual -trade in detail, for
example, it could monitor selected trades. Over the long run, there is no
substitute for getting a better picture of emissions profiles for individual
firms and consumers. However, in the past, Congress and the EPA have
demonstrated a marked unwillingness to address this problem.
Another potential objection to this plan is that it runs counter to the
intent and legislative requirements of the Clean Air Act. Under current
law, there is a distinction between new and existing sources. Sources
which were in existence when emissions were first inventoried in the
mid-1970s are called existing sources; sources which have been built
18. The recent EPA emissions trading policy statement attempts to address these issues. See 51
Fed. Reg. 43,814-60 (1986).
19. For a somewhat more pessimistic assessment of the potential for trading, see A.S. Meiburg,
Innovation and Infrastructure:Competing or Complementary Goals in Air Pollution Control (1987)

(presented at the 80th Annual APCA Meetings, New York, N.Y., June 21-26).
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since that time are called new sources. The distinction between new and
existing sources is important because new sources generally must comply
with more stringent technology-based regulations. Existing sources have
the option of meeting emissions standards through conventional approaches
or by purchasing emissions credits. If Congress is unwilling to lift the
restrictions on new sources, then this proposal may be infeasible.
As an alternative, consider a second option which requires all new
sources to meet the more stringent control requirements, but is otherwise
identical to the first proposal. Relative to the first option, this proposal
could be expected to reduce the amount of new sources locating in nonattainment areas since it would be more expensive to locate there. Additionally, the overall level of cost savings would decline, since new sources
would have less flexibility in how control requirements were met. The
major advantage of this proposal in comparison to the first proposal is
political. Part of the reason for the existing new source legislation is to
protect eastern coal mining jobs. This proposal would retain the regulations that protect these jobs. At the same time it would add much greater
flexibility into the existing system by changing the stucture of the regulatory system to promote trading. The structural changes would be precisely the same as those discussed in the previous option.
Both the first and second options represent radical departures from the
status quo. Moreover, they tend to accentuate the role of markets. If there
is anything that recent lessons from the application of market-based
approaches has taught us, it is that full-blown markets tend to be the
exception rather than the rule.2" This is especially true when there is a
great deal of controversy over the appropriate distribution of property
rights, and it is difficult to monitor and enforce standards. For precisely
these reasons, it is unlikely that these two approaches will be implemented. Thus, it is worthwhile considering policies that are more in line
with the existing regulatory approach.
The third option consists of building directly on EPAs current strategy
for dealing with the ozone problem. EPA currently identifies control
strategies that must be used for both new stationary sources and mobile
sources. For example, recently there has been a debate over whether to
install devices in gas tanks which reduce emissions from refueling. The
control strategy is referred to as "onboard." 2 The automobile companies
are understandably concerned about the cost and effectiveness of this
20. R. Hahn, Economic Prescriptionsfor Environmental Problems: Not Exactly What the Doctor
Ordered (1987) (Working Paper, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie Mellon Univ.,
Pittsburgh, Pa.).
21. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EVALUATION OF AIR POLLUTION REGULATORY
STRATEGIES FOR GASOLINE MARKETING INDUSTRY (Office of Air and Radiation, EPA-450/3-84-012a,
1984).
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option. Yet, under the current system, their options are quite limited if
EPA decides to implement this approach. They must comply with the
technology-based standard or be in violation of the law.
An alternative approach is to continue to allow EPA to impose technology-based standards, but to allow companies to meet the standards by
making equivalent or greater emissions reductions through other means.
This concept is very similar to the EPA's existing "bubble policy". The
bubble policy allows a firm to add up the emission limits from individual
sources of a pollutant in a plant, and to adjust the levels of control applied
to different sources so long as this aggregate limit is not exceeded. The
bubble policy, as currently implemented, applies to existing sources. The
approach considered here is precisely analogous to the bubble concept,
except that it would apply to new regulations on both mobile and stationary
sources.
Consider the example of the onboard system. Suppose the automobile
companies found a new, less expensive, technology which significantly
reduced emissions, such as a new catalytic converter or a new fuel. Then,
they should be allowed to implement this technology instead of the federally mandated solution provided it meets or exceeds the environmental
targets that the regulators had in mind when setting the standards. Even
if the companies do not make the reductions themselves, they should still
be allowed to receive credit for them, provided they can persuade other
companies to make changes which result in verifiable emissions reductions. Thus, for example, the automobile companies might find it less
cosily to pay oil refiners to reduce emissions than to install the onboard
system themselves.
There is no reason why this third option could not be extended to
specific policies mandated by states to meet the ozone standard as well.
In any instance where regulators promulgate a technology-based standard,
firms could be given the opportunity to identify and implement an approach
which either is less costly or achieves equivalent or greater improvements
in environmental quality.
The third option would still require major emission reductions in some
nontattainment areas. States and local areas would have the primary
responsibility for regulations in these areas. However, EPA could augment
these reductions with regulatory requirements and guidelines, such as
onboard strategies. Note, however, that EPA need not pursue a strategy
that requires across-the-board emission reductions in all areas. Rather, it
could continue to focus its efforts on nonattainment areas. Difficulties
will inevitably arise in targeting mobile source reductions. However, these
difficulties do not imply that the best route is necessarily to require all
mobile sources to install stringent control equipment.
One of the attractive features of this approach is that it does not require
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major administrative changes. EPA would continue to regulate ozone
within the existing framework. The only significant change would be the
added flexibility given to firms in meeting new standards. Yet, this change
is important because it could, increase the political acceptability of the
current approach by allowing firms the opportunity to save money by
implementing less costly control technologies.
The proposals presented here are not without problems. Moreover,
there are many details which would need to be worked out in implementing
these ideas. Since design issues have been addressed in detail by several
authors, the focus in this article will be on those issues which are likely
to be of greatest concern for the particular problem at hand. 22
One important issue is how to compare emissions reductions from
different kinds of sources. In this area, there are likely to be important
tradeoffs between administrative simplicity and the the degree to which
the regulatory approach is fine-tuned to address specific features of individual sources. It is clear that certain kinds of emissions reductions are
subject to greater uncertainties than others. For example, stationary source
reductions may be more easily estimated and verified than reductions in
emissions involving mobile sources. Even within the stationary source
category, the ability to verify reductions will differ across sources. It
would be cumbersome and unnecessary to define emission credits which
differ in value for every abatement technology. Unless there are pressing
reasons for considering reductions from one source as being less effective
or less certain than similar reductions from another source, the two reductions should be weighted equally by the regulator. This is not to suggest
that all reductions of a particular type of emissions be treated equally.
Attention can and should be given to the costs of monitoring, and the
distribution of uncertainty over claimed emission reductions. When agency
monitoring costs are very high, or uncertainty is quite large, this might
constitute grounds for either diluting the value of a particular credit, or
alternatively, asking the source proposing the reduction to address these
issues constructively.
A related issue is how to design an overall scheme for achieving reductions in ozone.23 As noted earlier, both VOCs and NO,, emissions contribute to the formation of ozone, and they do so in a highly nonlinear
manner. It is by no means obvious that the best approach for addressing
22. For a discussion of general design issues, see Hahn & Noll, supra note 13; & T. TIETENBERG,
(1985). For an evaluation and
discussion of concrete policy proposals related to emissions trading, see R. Hahn & G. Hester,
supra note 6; R. Liroff, supra note 6, at 135-45.
23. R. Hahn, G. McRae & J. Milford, Coping with Complexity in the Design of Environmental
Policy (1985) (Working Paper 87-16, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie Mellon Univ.,
Pittsburgh, Pa.) (forthcoming J. ENVTL. MGMT.).
EMISSIONs TRADING: AN EXERCISE.IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLIcY
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the ozone problem in specific areas is to continue to reduce VOC emissions. States need to re-evaluate this strategy. All of the proposals suggested above can be used to help meet changes in the required levels of
NO., or VOC emissions. 24
The options examined here are not foolproof. Thus, it is reasonable to
ask what happens if a mistake is made. The answer to this question
depends on the source of the error and the size of the problem it creates.
Probably, the most serious problem relates to missing the overall target
for emissions reductions. As noted earlier, this can be accommodated in
the first two options by further tightening of the overall number of available emission credits. Under the third option, EPA would have to continue
imposing more stringent measures, and then allow firms to search for
alternative ways of meeting the prescribed emissions limits.
All three of these proposals are designed to set up a system of incentives
that directly involves industry in a constant search for more productive
ways of cleaning up environmental problems. The specific details of the
proposals are meant to be suggestive. For example, the appropriate method
for allocation of permits would be determined by the political process.
Grandfathering is suggested here only because the existing distribution
of property rights frequently has an important effect on the design of new
regulatory systems. 25 The only part of the design that is critical is allowing
firms greater flexibility in meeting prescribed environmental targets.
Given the promise of these proposals, it is reasonable to consider why
they have not been implemented. One problem is legal. The first option
may not be allowed because it would no longer require new sources in
nonattainment areas to meet specific emission targets. However, the status
of new source trading is changing. EPA recently approved a bubble which
allows trades between two generators that are subject to the same new
source regulation.26
The other two options appear to be well within the realm of what EPA
and states could do within the current bounds of the Clean Air Act. Thus,
the reasons for not using these options must lie elsewhere. To understand
the reasons for not exploring these options, it is useful to look at the past
attitudes of key actors in the decision making process. At the federal
level, neither Congress nor EPA has ever been terribly disposed towards
24.
see R.
(1987)
Pa.).
25.

For a proposal that would allow regulators to trade off among NO, and/or VOC emissions
Hahn, A New Approach to the Design of Regulation in the Presence of Multiple Objectives
(Working Paper 87-8, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh,
See generally Rolph, Government Allocation of PropertyRights: Who Gets What?, 3 J.PoL'Y

ANALYSIS & MGMT. 45 (1983); Welch, The Political Feasibility of Full Ownership Property Rights:

The Cases of Pollution and Fisheries, 16 POL'Y SCL 165 (1983); R. Hahn, supra note 20.
26. 50 Fed. Reg. 3688-95 (1985).
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moving away from command-and-control approaches. While some states
have employed market-based approaches, state and local agencies have
not generally promoted this option, except in a few circumstances. The
past attitudes of industry towards trading is characterized by a healthy
skepticism. There has been concern that these approaches might not confer
significant benefits, and might introduce considerable uncertainty. Environmentalists have vigorously opposed most attempts at initiating or
expanding the scope for trading, arguing that trading is very difficult 27to
implement without resulting in adverse environmental consequences.
The most vigorous support for previous trading initiatives has come
from a surprisingly small set of individuals. In the case of emissions
trading, the primary support for this program came from a small group
of scholars and reform-minded bureaucrats. 28
Is there any reason to think the views of various groups will change?
I believe there is. As it becomes increasingly apparent that the commandand-control options are not buying very much, both industry and environmentalists may become more receptive to different alternatives. Legislators will be left with three basic choices. The first is to "redefine"
the standard in areas where it can't be met. The second is to continue
along the current path, which is unlikely to buy very much, but gives an
outward appearance that something constructive is happening out there.
The third is to explore new approaches along the lines suggested here.
If new approaches are to be promoted, in all likelihood, Congress will
have to provide greater incentives for both EPA and the states to explore
these ideas. The key signal that Congress will need to send out is that
flexibility is going to be encouraged in meeting the goals of the Clean
Air Act. For example Congress could require, at a minimum, that EPA
allow firms to use alternative approaches for meeting their proposed
standards. Moreover, it could suggest that alternative approaches be viewed
in the same context as the current approach to regulation. There is currently a striking asymmetry between emission credits which are traded
and those which are not traded in terms of how they are treated.29 Emissions trading effectively establishes two classes of emission rights: those
which are traded and those which are not. State regulators have tended
to treat traded rights in a way that affords them an inferior status. This
can be seen in the treatment of banked credits in selected banking pro27. See R. Liroff, supra note 6, at 57; National Clean Air Coalition, supra note I, at 38-47.
28. R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 6. See also Meidinger, On Explaining the Development of
"Emissions Trading" in U.S. Air Pollution flegulation, 7 LAw & POL'Y 447 (1985).
29. R. Hahn & G. Hester, The Markets for Bads: EPA's Experience with Emissions Trading
(1987) (Working paper, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh,
Pa., forthcoming in REG.).
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grams. 3 These credits are sometimes subject to a "discount" which is a
de facto partial confiscation. The inferior status of traded rights can also
be seen in the close scrutiny regulators give to the creation of emission
credits. Eliminating this asymmetry in the treatment of credits would help
induce firms to search more vigorously for cost saving environmental
-improvements. All three options presented above could be tailored so that
traded rights could stand on an equal footing with untraded rights.
Related to this idea, Congress could require that EPA spell out the type
of tradeoffs it will allow among different types of technologies." For
example, how much credit will be given for using cleaner fuels in automobiles, such as methanol, or different blends of gasoline? Currently,
firms do not have much of an incentive to explore such options. This
incentive could be increased by spelling out the rules which apply in
counting the environmental benefits from different approaches.
Spelling out these trade offs will not be easy in some cases. Moreover,
the task is complicated by the fact that many technologies do not offer
unambiguous improvements for all pollutant categories. These technologies could be precluded from being adopted, as is typically done now.
However, this strategy may not make sense either from the perspective
of increasing overall environmental quality or reducing costs.
Congress should also consider encouraging EPA to specify conditions
under which trading could take place between NO, and VOC reductions.
As noted earlier, this is a tricky problem in that the specific schemes
adopted will need to be tailored to air quality conditions in specific
regions. EPA would need to provide guidance to the states about what
sort of trade offs are permissible.32
An important strategic issue in addressing the ozone nonattainment
problem is the extent to which controls are targeted for nonattainment
areas. In the past, Congress and the EPA have been reluctant to promote
standards for mobile sources that differ by regions. However, as noted
above, targeted strategies may be better than across-the-board standards
if the problem is viewed as regional. Thus, even if EPA's onboard strategy
were a good idea, it need not be required for all cars if the sole objective
30. Banking allows a firm to store an emission credit for future use once it has been created. See
R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 6, for a detailed evaluation of actual banking activity under the
emissions trading program. See R. Hahn & G. Hester, supra note 14, for an examination of the
lead banking program, which has been the most active program to date.
31. For a critical view on past EPA policies, see Gray, Octane, Ozone, and Obstinacy, II REG.
37 (1987).
32. California has already begun to use interpollutant trades on a limited basis for a variety of
pollutants. Examples include trades of NO, for VOCs, and trades of particulate matter for NO ,
VOCs, and sulfur oxides. Telephone interview with R. Menebroker, Chief, Project Review Branch,
California Air Resources Board, Sacramento, Cal. (July 21, 1987).
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is to reach attainment in areas which currently exceed the standard. As
noted above, a critical part in designing the mobile source component of
an ozone control strategy is to ensure that reductions in emissions are
verifiable. This problem can be handled in several ways. Credits for
emission reductions could be based on estimated emissions associated
with different types of mobile source categories. For example, sales of
vehicles to owners of dedicated fleets, such as taxicabs, could result in
higher levels of emission credits per vehicle than sales to the public at
large.
Even if Congress came out unambiguously in favor of market-based
alternatives which promote meeting the standard, it is possible that very
little would actually be done to enhance environmental quality. There are
two reasons why this outcome might arise. One is that the market-based
programs could be designed poorly. A second, and probably more likely
one, is that the current system of rewards and sanctions will serve as a
major impediment to getting states to move in a timely manner. The
rewards for being in attainment are not terribly high; moreover, the credible sanctions are not available to EPA for inducing progress in nonattainment areas. The current set of draconian sanctions related to highway
funds, sewage treatment funds, and construction bans, need to be replaced
by measures which are less blunt. Administrators have been very reluctant
to impose these sanctions because they have potentially dire economic
and political consequences. In addition to exploring the modification of
sanctions, Congress may want to reconsider the amount of discretion the
administrator has in imposing particular sanctions. If sanctions and rewards
are viewed as credible, then states are more likely to take them seriously.
If EPA were given a signal to promote flexibility, there are several
steps it might take. Consistent with the suggestions above regarding
legislative changes, it could provide greater guidance on tradeoffs so
firms had a better sense of the payoffs that would result from adopting
innovative technologies. Another way of increasing trading activity is to
decrease the level of federal oversight on particular trades. EPA's "generic
bubble" policy, which allows states to approve bubbles without direct
federal oversight, represents a step in this direction. The agency could
also establish a series of rules regarding trading between new and existing
sources in nonattainment areas, if this were not spelled out in the enabling
legislation.
This section has argued that the current Clean Air Act is not sufficient
to promote widespread use of markets as a vehicle for expediting attainment. Changes will be required in the Clean Air Act and in the way EPA
interacts with the states if market-based approaches are going to play a
significant role in addressing the ozone nonattainment problem. While
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the second and third options outlined above could probably be implemented without any legislative changes, it is unlikely that they will be
adopted in the current political environment.
CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Economists are quick to point out that "there is no free lunch." In
some ways, though, there is a free lunch out there. It is possible to
decrease costs and increase environmental quality through the judicious
design and implementation of new regulatory approaches. Of course,
what is possible and what will actually happen are two very different
things. This explains, in part, why attempts to initiate market-based
approaches have met with such strong resistance. Many groups simply
do not believe that greater reliance on the market approaches will work.
Some groups also question whether these approaches represent an appropriate response to environmental problems.
Appropriate or not, I have tried to argue that more flexible approaches
may be one of the few ways that can be used to help achieve the ozone
standard. These approaches are not without their pitfalls, but then neither
is the existing system.
If Congress is interested in using market approaches as a key strategy
in reaching attainment, it must take at least two important steps to promote
their use. The first is to send out a clear sign on the desirability of using
market mechanisms. At present, innovative market-based approaches play
a small role in environmental management. The best way to upgrade this
role is for Congress to encourage EPA and states to implement these
approaches where they are appropriate in nonattainment areas. For example, Congress could mandate that states which are unable to convincingly
demonstrate attainment be required to use market-based approaches as
part of their attainment strategy.
The second step which Congress needs to take is to provide credible
sanctions in the event of nonattainment. This is a generic problem with
the current approach to air pollution control. Without the appropriate
rewards and sanctions, it is unlikely that states and local areas will make
much progress toward reaching attainment. Existing rewards and sanctions have been shown to be insufficient to induce some states and local
areas to take the necessary steps.
This paper has focused exclusively on market-based approaches. However, there is no reason, in principle, why other incentive-based options,
such as emissions fees, could not be considered as well. For example,
firms could be permitted to pay a fee to the state in lieu of obtaining
emission reduction credits directly. Revenues from this fee could then be
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used to enhance environmental quality. The firm paying the fee would
be given emission credits based on the expected environmental improvements that would result from using revenues from the fee. In addition to
enhancing environmental quality directly, these revenues could also be
used to improve emissions inventories and monitoring capabilities. This
is an area that deserves further exploration.
Given current political interests, it is unlikely that full-blown markets
will be used to address the ozone nonattainment problem. It is possible,
but unlikely that a more incremental approach, such as the limited trading
described in the the third option, will be used. As it becomes more
apparent that the political costs of reaching attainment are quite high,
Congress will be left with some difficult choices, including effectively
rescinding the current standard for selected areas. If Congress is serious
about wanting to use market approaches, legislation will be needed to
help promote their use.

